The paper studies e¢ cient risk sharing under limited enforcement (or "limited commitment") constraints determined by the threat of punishment after misbehavior. As in Kocherlakota (1996) , I assume that society chooses from among those allocations implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium. Rather than assume that punishments implement the least desirable continuation equilibrium, I allow that punishments may be suboptimally speci…ed from the point of view of enforcement. I characterize (up to a technical condition) the set of allocations that may be interpreted as e¢ cient subject to enforcement by some punishment. The conditions rationalizing such e¢ ciency are very weak; they are (i) resource exhaustion, (ii) satisfaction of individual rationality constraints at each continuation, and (iii) …niteness of the value of the allocation under the implicit decentralizing price system, the "high implied interest rates" condition of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) . I show that e¢ cient allocations may be decentralized and I state versions of the Welfare Theorems for my environment.
Introduction
What characteristics of the consumption processes of a cohort of agents over time are consistent with e¢ cient risk sharing? Under the canonical speci…cation of preferences for consumption used in the macroeconomics literature, we can reject the hypothesis whenever we can conclude that intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are not equated across agents at each point in time. Indeed, one is not hard pressed to assemble data that contradict this implication of e¢ ciency. 1 Recent research has focused on deriving the observable implications for e¢ ciency and equilibrium in economies encumbered by enforcement (or "commitment") frictions, but that are otherwise frictionless. In particular, these economies feature perfect information and no transactions costs. Of critical importance in such work is the speci…cation of what agents may accomplish after a behavioral defection from prescribed or contracted actions; that is, speci…cation of punishments. In this respect, Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) have set the paradigm adopted by the rest of the literature. Following Abreu (1988) , these authors each suppose that agents are treated to the harshest punishment that is available subject to the exogenously speci…ed "autarkic"capabilities of individuals.
A viewpoint motivating the present work is that e¢ cient mechanisms (e.g., markets) may organize the front line (i.e., the equilibrium path) of economic behavior, but the response to a defection from the norm of prescribed behavior may be suboptimal from the point of view of enforcement. More precisely, rather than choosing punishments optimally, I assume that defecting agents are punished by reversion to some arbitrary subgame perfect continuation equilibrium.
The fundamental results of the paper constitute a characterization (up to a technical condition) of the set of consumption allocations can be rationalized as e¢ cient with respect to some (generically suboptimal) punishments. The conditions a¤ording such an interpretation are (i) exhaustion of resources, (ii) satisfaction of individual rationality conditions at each continuation, and (iii) …niteness of the value of the allocation under the implicit decentralizing price system, the "high implied interest rates" condition of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) . These conditions are obviously quite weak.
I also show how e¢ cient allocations can be decentralized in Arrow-Debreu markets with "solvency constraints" that set lower limits on agents' claims positions as in on what behavior may be rationalized by modeling punishment institutions more explicitly as these papers do.
In the next section, I introduce the environment and the underlying game played by its agents. The analysis and the principal results are contained in the third section.
The fourth section considers decentralization of e¢ cient alloctions in markets with solvency constraints. The …nal section concludes.
Model

Environment
Time is discrete and in…nite, and is indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; ::: There are I < 1 agents in the economy indexed by i 2 I = f1; 2; :::; Ig : Stochastic features of the environment are summarized by a Markov process s t taking values in a …nite set S: In what follows, I will write for the correspondence mapping from S to the set of all SPEs starting from a given state. Given f; let us say that c is supported by f if there exists a path such that c = ( ) and ( ; f ) is an SPE; in this case, write c 2 P (f ) :
Punishments and the Strategies of Interest
Given a path ; the amount of consumption that i can obtain by defecting unilaterally from the path at state history s t is bounded above by
It is an important property of the restrictions placed on play after a defection in the environment is that the payo¤ to an agent in the period after a defection depends only on the identity of the defecting agent. This property and the one-deviation property induce the following characterization of the set of equilibria of the form
Lemma 2 Given a path and a punishment f; ( ; f ) is an SPE if and only if
for all i; t; and s t :
I stress an analogy between strategies of the form ( ; f ) and those supported by Abreu's (1988) "optimal simple penal code" that imposes that any unilateral defection triggers a reversion to a particular equilibrium continuation that depends only on the identity of the defector. Each concept has the property that punishments are independent of the event that triggers them. The di¤erence here is that the reversion need not be the worst SPE continuation; rather, I allow that a lighter punishment may be prescribed.
In much of the related literature, the properties of allocations that can be supported as SPE allocations by the threat of reversion to autarkic strategies is studied.
In what follows, I will address questions that are more general in the sense that I
do not take a stand on the form of the punishments, except to require that they implement equilibrium continuations. First, I will examine the properties of allocations that are optimal with respect to a speci…c welfare criterion subject to being supported by a given punishment for defection. Second, I will ask when it can be gleaned that a given allocation is e¢ cient in this sense for some punishment.
E¢ cient SPE Allocations
I begin this section by showing how to construct, for a given allocation, a path that supports the allocation in way that minimizes the incentive for defection. A useful result along the lines of the discussion at the close of the previous subsection is that this may be done independently of the punishment itself.
Given an allocation c; I construct path to be denoted^ (c) as follows. De…ne
It may be seen that^ (c) implements c with the minimal volume of transfers.
In particular, an agent that consumes less that his endowment at a given state history makes transfers totalling e i (s t ) c i (s t ) ; and one that consumes more than his endowment makes no transfers. It follows that g i ( ) (s t ) = max fc i (s t ) ; e i (s t )g : The utility of making the minimal volume of transfers is seen in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 An allocation c is supported by a punishment f if and only if (^ (c) ; f )
is an SPE.
One interpretation of this result is that intra-temporal transfer arrangements may be chosen to optimally apply the enforcement technology; and, as long as the enforcement technology is described by reversion to a punishment chosen only as a function of the identity of the defector, the implementing path may be chosen independently of the punishments. In particular, a net clearing mechanism is best-suited in this regard.
Corollary 1 An allocation c is supported by a punishment f if and only if
and
I will say that c is e¢ cient with respect to f if c is maximal in P (f ) for
for some in the I-dimensional unit simplex. From Corollary 1 and the monotonicity of u ( ) ; it is equivalent to say that c is e¢ cient with respect to f if, for some ; c solves the programming problem of maximizing (10) subject to the feasibility constraints
for all t and s t ; and the inequality constraints (8) and (9) . In what follows, I apply the term e¢ cient generally to an allocation to mean that it is e¢ cient with respect to some punishment.
In the risk-sharing literature, equation of agents'intertermporal marginal rates of substitution is the quintessential criterion for e¢ ciency. In economies with lim-ited enforcement, binding enforcement constraints may preclude that acheivement. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the following de…nitions are useful for describing a phenomenon that is implied by e¢ ciency in such environments. For a given allocation c; de…ne
I will say that c has high implied interest rates (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)) or
The following proposition establishes that having high implied interest rates is a general property of e¢ cient consumption allocations, at least up to the restriction that P (f ) has an interior point.
Proposition 2 Suppose thatĉ is e¢ cient with respect to a given punishment f; and suppose that P (f ) has an interior point. Thenĉ 2 HIR:
The following example applies the concepts developed above and Proposition 2 to a speci…c simple environment. It also shows that an e¢ cient allocation need not exhibit high implied interest rates when P (f ) does not have an interior point. ; and let us suppose that u (c) = ln c: The utility of autarkic consumption is
for the agent with the high endowment, and
for the agent with the low one.
In this example, I consider the punishment de…ned at each continuation by the autarkic strategies; call this punishment f aut . 3;4 Let us consider the support and e¢ ciency of an alternating consumption plan characterized by a parameter c with respect to this punishment, where the allocation is de…ned such that the agent with the high endowment consumes c; and the agent with the low endowment consumes 1 c: Call this allocation C ( c) : Writing P (f aut ) for the set of allocations that can be supported by the autarkic punishments for a given , it can be seen that, for c 2
3 The autarkic punishment is the one that maps to the unique strategy in which no transfers are ever made by any agent after any history. 4 In general, the ability to implement of a given (candidate) punishment as an equilibrium depends on : Autarky is the unique SPE that is implementable for all 0:
(Note that (16) and the de…nitions of V H ( ) and V L ( ) imply that
for c 2
; e H :) Therefore, the alternating endowment C ( c) is e¢ cient with respect
subject to (x; ) 0 and x 2 3 ; that is, if C ( c) maximizes the equally-weighted lifetime utility of the agents subject to the enforcement constraint on the agent with the high endowment in each period (and feasibility is imposed). It can be shown that c = for all values of ; that is, the autarkic allocation is in P (f aut ). It can be veri…ed that this is the only allocation in P (f aut ) for ) is supported for 0:70951:
5 Following the Kocherlakota (1996) , an allocation is …rst-best if it equates agents intertemporal rates of marginal substitution at all state histories and exhausts resources. An alternating allocation C ( c) is …rst-best if and only if c = Notice that
for all state histories in this example. 6 For an allocation c exhibiting …rst-best risk sharing, we have q (c ) = < 1; and the implied interest rates are always high. It may be veri…ed that, for = 0:6 and c = 0:58206; q (C ( c)) = 0:83561 < 1; so that C (0:58206) 2 HIR in this case, as well.
On the other hand, notice that q (e) < 1 if and only if < ; it is clear that the conclusion of case).
The next proposition establishes a partial converse of the previous one. In the spirit of Kocherlakota's (1996) work, it addresses a question about which consumption processes can be rationalized as e¢ cient. As in the previous proposition, the high implied interest rates condition plays an important role.
Proposition 3
; notice that q (C ( c)) < 1 whenever c 2 : By Proposition 2, this implies that there is some punishment that supports the alternating allocation C (:55) as e¢ cient.
It is instructive to understand what such a punishment looks like. 7 It can be seen that C (:55) is e¢ cient with respect to a punishmentf only if an agent who defects in a period when his endowment is high receives continuation 7 It is useful to note that, under the allocation C (:55) ; the agent with the high endowment gets continuation utility 
one may compute that V L f = 3:1065: An equilibrium continuation that delivers the required payo¤ to the agent with the low endowment is the one that delivers the consumption (1 C (ĉ)) = f1 ĉ;ĉ; 1 ĉ; :::g, whereĉ satis…es
that isĉ = 0:64169: We can choose the punishments for the low-endowment agent so that they will never be binding by settingf to implement the symmetric allocation 
is e¢ cient with respect to a punishment that speci…es reversion to a continuation equilibrium in which the agent with the high endowment gets consumption f:64169; :35831; :64169; :35831; :::g :
Note that the punishment is close to autarky, but is somewhat better for each agent.
Decentralization
The notion of market equilibrium introduced in this section is a generalization of that studied by Alvarez and Jermann (2000) .
A portfolio of contingent claims for agent i is a stochastic process b i with b i (s t ) 2 R: I write b for the pro…le of agents'portfolios.
An (Arrow) price system is a positive stochastic process p; where p (s t ; s t+1 ) is interpreted as the price after (exogenous) history s t of a claim to a unit of the good after history s t+1 :
A system of solvency constraints is a stochastic process d with d (s t ) 2 R I :
A competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints is a consumption allocation c; a pro…le of portfolios b; a price system p; and a system of solvency constraints d such that 
The following Proposition, which may be interpreted as a version of the First Welfare Theorem for the present environment, is an obvious corollary of Proposition
3.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (c; b; p; d) is an equilibrium with solvency constraints;
for all i; t; s t ; and that c 2 HIR; then there are punishments f such that c is e¢ cient with respect to f:
A version of the Second Welfare Theorem that applies is the following. 
From the budget constraints, we have
and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the solvency constraints supporting an allocation e¢ cient with respect to the autarkic punishments may be chosen so that
for all i; t; s t : This is an intuitive benchmark for an economy in which agents are able only to consume their own endowments in a period in which they defect. On the other hand, solvency constraints de…ned by (30) are su¢ cient for the decentralization of an allocation e¢ cient with respect to autarkic punishments. The conditions (30) serve in this case, because (uniquely for the autarkic punishments) (8) implies (9) : Thus, it can be seen that the support constraints will never bind for i in a period in which c i (s t ) > e i (s t ) ; so that the associated solvency constraints will not be binding either. More generally, this need not be the case. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that (30) implies that the solvency constraints are non-positive, and thus they may be interpreted naturally as constraints only on the amount of state-contingent "debt" agents may take on. That this must be so can be seen from the fact that autarkic consumption for all time after s t satis…es the budget constraints after s t for an agent with exactly zero wealth; this implies
Thus, if the solvency constraints are consistent with (30), it must be that J i the result. This property, too, may fail for more general punishments.
Conclusion
The paper studies e¢ cient multilateral risk sharing subject to enforcement (or "commitment") constraints determined by the threat of punishment after misbehavior. As in Kocherlakota (1996) , I assume that the society chooses from among those allocations implementable under subgame perfect equilibria. The novelty of the present analysis is that, while most of the existing literature studies e¢ ciency when the least desirable continuation equilibrium is assumed to obtain after a defection, I allow that punishments may coordinate play on a continuation equilibrium that is suboptimal from the point of view of enforcement. I take a relatively agnostic view about what may constitute a punishment convention, imposing only the following restriction on the enforcement technology: following Abreu (1988) , the punishments are de…ned by the choice of a subgame perfect equilibrium continuation to be followed after a defection, and the selection depends only on the exogenous history and the identity of the defector.
The main results of the paper constitute a characterization (up to a technical condition) of the set of allocations that may be interpreted as e¢ cient with respect to some punishment. The observable restrictions imposed by e¢ ciency are very weak; these are (i) exhaustion of resources, (ii) satisfaction of an individual rationality constraint at each continuation, and (iii) …niteness of the value of the aggregate endowment under an implicit decentralizing price system, the "high im-plied interest rates" condition of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) . Proposition 2 shows that an allocation that is e¢ cient with respect to some punishments has properties (i)-(iii) whenever the constraint set has an interior point. Proposition 3 shows that an allocation that has these properties is e¢ cient with respect to some punishment (constructed in the proof of the Proposition).
A heuristic motivation for studying such an environment is the notion that, while front line institutions may facilitate the arrival of the economy at a locally e¢ cient outcome, coordination of play o¤ the equilibrium path may be accomplished less e¤ectively. For example, participation in markets is the focal device for coordinating this "front line", and much theory and evidence establishes their e¢ ciency properties; but there is less agreement about how the institutions that govern the treatment of bankruptcy are determined. In economies with limited enforcement, these punishment institutions determine which paths may be sustained in equilibrium. Thus, the determination of these features is obviously important.
There are a number of papers that study market economies with limited enforcement in which the determination of the punishments is carefully modeled, and even endogenous. Perri (2002, 2004) Under what circumstances and in what ways will the optimal transfer algorithm depend on the punishments? Second, it might be interesting to study the implications of applying a restriction like renegotiation-proofness to the set of admissible equilibria. 9 Of related interest are criteria under which punishment continuations can be sustained in markets, and the possibility that punishment continuations may be interpreted to obtain on the equilibrium path. 10 Finally, it may of focal interest to study economies in which punishments are applied randomly after a deviation. Such a model may o¤er a simple parameterization of the "degree of enforcement"available in an economy useful in calibrations and empirical work.
constitutes an SPE for histories on the path, note that a defection at any history h t in which c i (s t ) e i (s t ) gets i at most
and by deviating at a history with c i (s t ) < e i (s t ), i gets at most
Thus, the one-deviation property implies that there can be no pro…table defection from ; Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that ( ; f ) is an SPE; and suppose that 
Th inequality above shows that this defection is pro…table for " > 0 small enough.
The existence of a pro…table defection is a contradiction; thus, the (7) must hold whenever ( ; f ) is an SPE.
For the converse, suppose that (7) holds for all s t : First note that these conditions and the fact that
for all s t ; thus (by Lemma 1) there is an SPE (continuation) that delivers payo¤
is a selection from the set of (continuation) equilibria feasible from state s 0 ; it follows that ( ; f ) describes an equilibrium for each subgame o¤ of the path : Moreover, there can be no pro…table defection along the path , since a defection at a history h
The result then follows from Lemma 2.
Proof of Corollary 1. From the proof of Proposition 1, the result follows after noting that
order conditions
for each i and s t : These conditions imply that (s t ) > 0 for all s t ; and that
Now it follows from (12) and (13) that
so that are the l 1 components of elements in the non-negative orthant of the normdual of l 1 . This space can be interpreted to be l 1 + f a; where f a is the space of …nitely additive Before giving the proof of Proposition 3, I present several auxiliary results useful in the proof of the main one.
In what follows, I de…ne (s) as the set of payo¤ vectors w 2 R I such that, for some 2 (s) ; w i = U i ( ( ) js) for each i; that is, (s) is the set of payo¤ vectors available under equilibria starting from state s:
Lemma 3 (s) is convex for each s:
Proof. The set of allocations that can be supported by strategies constructed as in the proof of Lemma 1 is easily seen to be convex. The convexity of (s) is then easy to establish from the continuity and concavity of U ( js) in allocations, and the fact that the action set admits the possibility of free-disposal of the good. 
